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Abstract
We compare economic and environmental outcomes under mixed and private oligopolies,
in order to examine the e¤ects of privatization when rms invest in abatement and
emissions are taxed. We show that the number of competing rms in the market is an
important factor in the determination of these e¤ects. While privatization often involves
a welfare trade-o¤, in the sense that higher (lower) output production implies higher
(lower) pollution, there are also circumstances where it leads to both lower output and
higher emissions simultaneously. Our results also indicate that privatization tends be
associated with reductions in social welfare.
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1 Introduction
The issue of privatization has retained a prominent place in the agenda of policy makers
for over three decades. Despite the fact that the views of governments and policy-inducing
international organizations seem to very often favour programmes of extensive privatization,
there are still many heated debates on the pros and cons of removing the direct engagement
of the public sector from the procurement of goods and services such as utilities, trans-
portation etc. Traditionally, these have focused on issues such as production e¢ciency; the
transparency of managerial practices; the quantity and quality of the supplied goods and
Dpt Economics, University of She¢eld, 9 Mappin Street, She¢eld (UK), S1 4DT. Email: m.j.gil-
molto@she¢eld.ac.uk
yDpt Economics, University of Leicester, University Road, Leicester (UK), LE1 7RH. Email:
dv33@le.ac.uk
1
services, as well as their cost to the consumers and/or tax payers etc. The concerns over
the widespread e¤ects of global warming and other forms of environmental degradation
have rekindled the interest on the merits and disadvantages of privatization. Particularly, a
new point of discussion revolves around the following question: What are the implications
for pollution, following a governments decision to relinquish its direct involvement in the
production of goods and services?
The relevance of this question becomes obvious once we consider the fact that environ-
mental damage is a by-product of economic activity. The amount of goods that an econ-
omy produces and consumes, as well as the environmental characteristics of the processes
involved in the production of these goods, determine the impact of economic activity on
environmental quality. As long as there are di¤erences in the decisions and actions of pri-
vate and public rms, originating from the markedly di¤erent objectives that these varying
forms of ownership entail, then it is highly likely that privatization will have signicant
implications for the quality of the natural environment.
The presence of public rms is quite common in many sectors in both developed and
developing countries. For example, public rms are major players in the energy sector all
over the world. EDF, Enel or Vattenfall A.B. are some of the largest electricity genera-
tors and distributors in Europe and are controlled or owned by the French, Italian and
Swedish governments respectively. The examples of publicly owned electricity generation
and distribution companies are not exclusively limited to Europe. Many similar examples
can be found in a variety of countries, such as South Korea (Korea Electric Power Cor-
poration), Canada (Hydro-Quebec) or Brazil (Electrobras). Statoil and Petrobras are also
major players in the oil industry and are controlled respectively by the Norwegian and the
Brazilian governments. Another sector where the public presence is common is transporta-
tion. Matsumura and Sunada (2013) provide examples of public sector involvement in the
airline markets, where many ag-carriers are still owned by the state and compete against
private airlines.1 Moreover, there is anecdotal evidence of public rms being major innova-
tive players in sectors such as energy (Godø et al., 2003). It is important to notice that the
industries mentioned here are among the industries that raise more environmental concerns
among policy makers and the wider public.
The objective of this paper is to compare the outcomes that transpire under mixed and
private oligopolies, in an environment where pollution imposes a societal cost and rms
decide on both their output and their investment in abatement. This comparison will allow
us to o¤er some insights into the desirability of privatization when there are important
environmental concerns due to the nature of the activity undertaken by rms. The acad-
1Matsumura and Sunada (2013) cite the examples of Czech Airlines (CSA), Polish Airlines (LOT), and
Portugal Airlines (TAP). Interestingly, the privatization of TAP is being negotiated at the time of writing
this paper under the Portuguese bail-out plan agreed with the EU and the IMF.
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emic literature on mixed oligopoly has so far focused on the advisability of privatization
but has largely absconded from any environmental considerations, despite the fact that
publicly owned or controlled rms are quite common in the real world, and particularly in
highly polluting sectors such as energy generation or transport, as argued before. Some
of the existing analyses have shown that privatizing a public rm improves social welfare
under a number of di¤erent assumptions.2 Other analyses have shown that if rms out-
puts are subsidized, privatization is at best irrelevant from the point of view of welfare
(White, 1996; Poyago-Theotoky, 2001 and Fjell and Heywood, 2004).3 With respect to
e¢ciency-enhancing innovation in the context of mixed oligopolies, it has been shown that
privatization tends to reduce innovation and welfare (Tomaru, 2007, Heywood and Ye, 2009
and Gil-Moltó et al., 2011). However, none of these papers contemplate investment to re-
duce emissions (that is, the social cost of production); rather, they focus on the (private)
cost-reducing innovation.4.
Some recent contributions have started introducing environmental aspects within the
frame of analysis of mixed oligopoly. Using the framework by Beladi and Chao (2006),
Saha (2012) shows that if an optimal pollution tax is employed, privatization of the public
monopoly does not a¤ect the resulting levels of output or pollution. However, in this
simple framework, the decision of the rm is limited to output (there are no abatement
investments). Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2006) analyze the case of a quantity-competing
mixed oligopoly with pollution where rms do choose their abatement levels. They show
that when the government implements a pollution tax, privatizing the public rm results
in lower pollution (and lower output). Using fairly general demand and cost functions, Pal
and Saha (2014) show that in a mixed duopoly with pollution, the rst best can be attained
if a tax on output and a subsidy to abatement activities are jointly employed, while keeping
one of the rms under full ownership by the public sector.
An important point of departure of our paper from the existing literature on mixed
oligopoly and environmental issues resides on our modelling of the abatement technology.
Both Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2006) and Pal and Saha (2014) consider the abatement
e¤ort not to have an e¤ect on gross emissions. That is, they assume the abatement tech-
nologies to be "end-of-pipe" Examples of such technologies are the installation of lters
or scrubbers, which allow rms to reduce emissions subsequently. In reality, abatement
2Namely, that the public rm is less e¢cient than the private rm and the marginal cost of production
is linear; the market is contestable; the number of private rms is large enough; and there are economies of
scale or the public rm is incurring losses (De Fraja and Delbono 1989, 1990; Estrin and de Meza, 1995;
Anderson et al., 1997; Matsumura and Kanda, 2005).
3However, if there is an excessive burden of taxation, privatization does a¤ect welfare (Matsumura and
Tomaru, 2013).
4A separate literature strand, less related to our paper, has focused on the issues of product innovation
with mixed results in terms of the desirability of privatization (see for example, Delbono and Denicolò, 1993;
Poyago-Theotoky, 1998; Matsumura and Matsushima, 2004 and Ishibashi and Matsumura, 2006).
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e¤orts will often a¤ect gross emissions instead, in particular when rms employ "process
integrated technologies". Examples of such technologies are switching to a cleaner fuel or
cleaner production technique.5 We will focus on this latter type of abatement technologies.
Moreover, unlike Pal and Saha (2014), we consider the case where there is a public rm
competing with n-private rms. In fact, the number of private rms in the market will be
of signicant importance for some of our results. We will assume, as standard, that the
public rm is social-welfare maximizer6 while private rms maximize prots.
Our results show that the tax on emissions has a positive e¤ect on the investment in
abatement and a negative e¤ect on output for both public and the private rms. Moreover, a
public rm in a mixed oligopoly will invest more in abatement but not necessarily produce
more than its private competitors. Note that the result according to which public rms
invest more in abatement activities corroborates with the existing empirical evidence (see
Fowlie, 2010). After privatization, the newly privatized rm invests less in abatement
(than it would do if it was kept under public ownership) and overall, emission intensities
increase with the privatization. The e¤ect on output is less clear-cut and depends on the
number of rms: With a relatively small (large) number of private rms, privatizing the
public rm leads to a decrease (increase) in aggregate output. All in all, emissions will
increase with the privatization when the number of rms is relatively large. In such case,
output and pollution increase with the privatization. For a relatively low number of rms,
pollution will decrease after privatization but this will come at the cost of lower output.
Interestingly, for intermediate values of rms, a privatization will result in both lower output
and higher emissions. This result holds regardless of the emission tax being exogenously
given or chosen to maximize welfare. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that the number
of competing rms may also be critical in determining the overall impact on social welfare.
However, the scenario that emerges for most of the cases is one where privatization has a
negative e¤ect on social welfare.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we introduce our
model. We solve the mixed and the private oligopolies in sections 3 and 4 respectively.
Section 5 is devoted to the comparison across the two regimes, which allows us to derive some
conclusion regarding the desirability of privatization. In Section 6, we provide an extension
where the emission tax rate is endogenously chosen by the government to maximize welfare.
Section 7 summarizes and concludes.
5See Requate (2005) for more on this distinction.
6The assumption that the public rm maximizes welfare is standard in the literature on mixed oligopoly
(see e.g., Anderson et al. (1997), De Fraja and Delbono (1989), Fjell and Heywood (2004), Matsushima
and Matsumura (2003), Pal and White (1998), Poyago-Theotoky (2001) and White (1996, 2002)). Using
unequal weights for the di¤erent components in the social welfare function would represent the case of
partial-privatization, as in Matsumura (1998).
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2 The model
Consider a market which consists of a unit-mass of identical consumers and an oligopoly
producing and selling quantities of a homogeneous product. The price of this product is
denoted by P . Each consumer is endowed with an exogenously given income of y and derives
utility from consuming the good according to her utility function
U = '+ aQ
Q2
2
; (1)
where Q is the consumption of the good, while ' denotes the quantity of all other goods
and acts as the numéraire. Given the price of the good P , the budget constraint facing the
consumer is given by
PQ+ ' = y: (2)
By rearranging and substituting (2) into (1), we get
U = y PQ+ aQ
Q2
2
: (3)
The rst order condition for maximization is therefore given by
@U
@Q
= P + a Q = 0: (4)
Solving the above equality, we obtain the demand function for the good at a price P
Q = a P: (5)
It is easy to verify that the above solution is indeed a maximum, since the second order
condition for maximization is fullled (@
2U
@Q2
= 1 < 0). Rearranging (5), we obtain the
inverse demand function facing the oligopoly
P = a Q;
where a > 1.7
The oligopoly comprises a public (welfare maximizing) rm and n private (prot max-
imizing) rms competing à la Cournot. We index the public rm with 0 and the private
rms with i, where i 1; n . Hence, total output is given by Q = q0+
n
i=1
qi. Firms choose
from a continuum of production technologies, indexed by x 0; 1 , which di¤er in their
7We use the restriction a > 1 as this is one of the su¢cient (but not necessary) conditions to guarantee
that the equilibrium outputs, derived from the solution to the rms problem, are non-negative.
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environmental characteristics. In particular, a technology of index x is associated with an
emission intensity (i.e., emissions per unit of output) given by
e0 = (1 x0)
2 ; ei = (1 xi)2: (6)
From (6), the reader can see that a choice of higher x corresponds to a cleaner production
method (i.e., lower emission intensities).8 In this respect, one can interpret x as an invest-
ment in an abatement technology. The quadratic functional form of e0 and ei is made to
reect the existence of diminishing returns to environmental investment. Given these, total
emissions by each rm are given by
E0 = e0q0 ; Ei = eiqi: (7)
Nevertheless, a cleaner production technology is associated with a higher cost of pro-
duction. This assumption is made to reect many real world observations. For example,
according to U.S. Energy Information Administration, renewable energy power plants can
be more expensive not only to build but also to operate (per unit of output) than natural
gas or coal-red plants.9 In line with this assertion, the British Royal Society of Engineering
estimates that the cost of electricity generated in, for example, wind farms can reach up
to 7.2 pence per kWh whereas coal based plants operate at a cost of up to 3.2 pence per
kWh.10 The examples about cleaner production being less cost e¢cient are not restricted
to the energy generation sector. The German Ship Owners Association calculates the costs
of shipping to be substantially higher if using cleaner fuels (LNG) than heavy oil, which
has important implications not only for this sector in particular, but also for any businesses
shipping goods or transporting passengers.11 Finally, according to the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, organic food is more expensive than conventional food,
partly due to the higher labour costs involved in its production.12 Given these observations,
we assume that rms production cost functions C0 = c(x0; q0) and Ci = c(xi; qi) are such
that
C0 = x0q0 + q
2
0 ; Ci = xiqi + q
2
i . (8)
Thus, it follows that rms face a trade-o¤ between reducing their emissions and producing
more e¢ciently (that is, with a lower marginal cost). The inclusion of the quadratic terms
8That is, the abatement technology is integrated, since the abatement e¤ort impacts on the emission
intensities.
9See http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/renewable_electricity.cfm
10See http://www.raeng.org.uk/news/publications/list/reports/Cost_Generation_Commentary.pdf.
11See http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/new-imo-regulations-push-shipping-industry-toward-
cleaner-fuel-and-lng-a-916811.html
12See http://www.fao.org/organicag/oa-faq/oa-faq5/en/
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in (8) is standard in the literature on mixed oligopoly to rule out the scenario where, in
equilibrium, only the public rm stays in the market. This scenario is less interesting from
the point of view of our paper, as we focus on the e¤ect of competition between public and
private rms on output and emissions levels.
We can rewrite C0 and Ci as functions of the emission intensities and output. By
inverting eq. (6), we get:
x0 = 1 e0 ; xi = 1 ei: (9)
Then, substituting the above into (8), we obtain:
C0(e0; q0) = (1 e0)q0 + q
2
0; (10)
Ci(ei; qi) = (1 ei)qi + q
2
i : (11)
It is then straightforward to verify that the above functions comply with Ce < 0, Cee > 0
and Ceq < 0, as in Requate (2005).
Given (8), a tax on emissions is required to induce (private) rms to invest in abate-
ment.13 As a consequence, we assume that emissions are taxed. Hence, rms prots are
given by
0 = Pq0 tE0 C0; (12)
i = Pqi tEi Ci;
where t is the tax rate on emissions. For most of our paper, we will assume that the tax
rate is exogenously given. This assumption could reect the scenario where the ownership
of the public rm belongs to a local authority and emission tax is set at a national level. For
example, in many countries electricity markets are organized at regional or local level and
public utility companies are owned by the local authorities. Such is the case of Norway14
or Canada15 Or, we could think of a situation where the ownership of the rm is held at
national level but the emission tax is set at federal level. For example, there is a substantial
debate about the desirability of pan-European16 or US-wide emission taxes.17 Alternatively,
the exogeneity of the emission tax could be related to budgetary constraints or pressure from
13Without taxation, there is no private benet of investing to reduce emissions. However, even in the
absence of emission taxation, the public rm would invest in abatement, since emissions negatively a¤ect
social welfare.
14See Von der Fehr and Vegard Hansen (2010).
15See https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-nsi/rnrgynfmtn/prcng/lctrct/cndnmrkt-eng.html),
16See http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/aviation-transport.qxj, for the case of aviation.
17See http://www.cbo.gov/budget-options/2013/44857.
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lobbies not allowing the tax rate to be modied after privatization. To appease possible
concerns regarding this assumption, in Section 6 we will undertake an extension where the
emission tax is endogenously chosen to maximize welfare.18
The revenues from taxing emissions are employed by the government to mitigate the
negative e¤ects of pollution. We assume that (net) pollution is given by
dt)(E0 +
n
i=1
Ei); (13)
where the parameter d [0; 1] measures how e¤ective the cleaning-up technology at the
governments disposal is. We impose that dt 1 in order to to guarantee non-negativity of
pollution.
All in all, the objective function of the public rm is given by the aggregation of producer
surplus and consumer surplus minus pollution. As standard producer surplus (PS) is the
aggregation of prots by all rms in this market
PS = 0 +
n
i=1
i; (14)
while consumer surplus (CS) is given by19
CS =
Q2
2
: (15)
Using (13)-(15), social welfare SW is given by
SW = 0 +
n
i=1
i +
Q2
2
(1 dt)(E0 +
n
i=1
Ei): (16)
We assume that rms simultaneously choose output and emission intensities. We will
start by solving the mixed oligopoly in the next section (Section 3), while for comparison
purposes, we will also solve the private oligopoly case in Section 4.
3 Mixed oligopoly
Recall that in this case we have one public rm and n private rms. The public rm chooses
q0 and x0 to maximize social welfare while each private rm chooses qi and xi to maximize
18We can anticipate that our main results remain qualitatively the same. The only di¤erence is that the
complexity of the model makes it impossible to derive a closed-form solution for the tax rate. For this reason,
we undertake the analysis by means of numerical examples.
19Note that substituting (5) into (3) yields U = y+ Q
2
2 . Since y is additive and exogenously given, it does
not impact in our subsequent analysis. Therefore CS can therefore be summarized as Q
2
2
:
8
individual prots.
The rst order conditions for maximization for each of the private rms are given by
i
@qi
= a 4qi q0
i0=i
qi0 tei xi = 0; (17)
i
@xi
= qi[2t(1 xi) 1] = 0; (18)
where
i0=i
qi0 indicates the aggregation of outputs by all other private rms.
The rst order conditions for maximization for the public rm are
@SW
@q0
=
@CS
@q0
+
@PS
@q0
@
@q0
= 0; (19)
@SW
@x0
=
@CS
@x0
+
@PS
@x0
@
@x0
= 0; (20)
where @CS@q0 ,
@PS
@q0
and @@q0 are respectively given by
@CS
@q0
= q0 +
n
i=1
qi; (21)
@PS
@q0
= a 4q0 2
n
i=1
qi te0 x0; (22)
@
@q0
= e0(1 dt): (23)
Hence, the rst order condition for maximization with respect to q0 is given by
@SW
@q0
= 3q0 + a
n
i=1
qi te0 x0 e0(1 dt) = 0: (24)
On the other hand, @CS@x0 = 0, while
@PS
@x0
and @@x0 are respectively given by
@PS
@x0
= 2tq0(1 x0) q0; (25)
@
@x0
= 2(1 dt)q0(1 x0): (26)
Hence, the rst order condition for maximization of the public rms objective function
with respect to x0 is given by
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@SW
@x0
= 2q0 (1 x0)[1 + t(1 d)] 1 = 0: (27)
Solving i@xi = 0 and
@SW
@x0
= 0 yields the following interior solutions in terms of the
investment in abatement by each private rm (xi ) and the public rm (x0):
xi = 1
1
2t
xpr i; (28)
x0 = 1
1
2[1 + t(1 d)]
: (29)
Note that a larger tax rate will yield a higher investment in abatement for both types of
rms. Note as well that t 1=2 is required so that xpr is non-negative. Thus, this condition
is henceforth assumed to hold.
Now, substituting x0 into @SW@q0 and solving for q0, we nd the public rms (output)
reaction function
qR0 =
1
3
a
n
i=1
qi 1 +
1
4 [1 + t(1 d)]
: (30)
Likewise, substituting xpr into i@qi and solving for qi, we nd each private rms (output)
reaction function
qRi =
1
4
a 1 q0
i0=i
qi0 +
1
4t
: (31)
Given that all the private rms are symmetric, in equilibrium, we will have that qi = qpr
i. Hence, the above mentioned reaction functions reduce to
q0 =
1
3
a 1 nqpr +
1
4[1 + t(1 d)]
; (32)
qpr =
1
n+ 3
a 1 q0 +
1
4t
: (33)
Note that a larger tax rate has a direct negative e¤ect on the output produced by both
private rms and the public rm (although in this latter case modulated by d). Solving the
above system yields the output solutions
q0 =
1
9 + 2n
3(a 1) +
1
4t
(3 + n)
t
1 + t(1 d)
n ; (34)
qpr =
1
9 + 2n
2(a 1) +
1
4t
3
t
1 + t(1 d)
: (35)
All in all q0, x0, qpr, xpr constitute the (Nash) equilibrium solution of the mixed oligopoly
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case.20 It is important to notice that qpr > 0 because
t
1+t(1 d) < 1 (since 0 < td 1). This
implies that the private rms always produce. So that to guarantee q0 > 0, an additional
constraint on n is needed. In particular we require that n n, where
n =
3t
1 td
1 + 4(a 1) [1 + t(1 d)] : (36)
Note that n > 1, given that t 1=2 and therefore 3t > 1. Hence, the restriction on n that
we require to guarantee the non-negativity of q0 can be summarized as follows.
21
Condition 1 [1; n].
Before we proceed to solve the case of the private oligopoly, a few points merit discussion
here. First of all, the emission intensities in equilibrium are lower for the public rm than
for the private rms, i:e: e0 < epr. The emission intensities can be calculated by substituting
x0 and xpr into e0 and ei, yielding
e0 =
1
4[1 + t(1 d)]2
; (37)
epr =
1
4t2
: (38)
Given that dt 1, it is easy to see that e0 < epr: The intuition behind this result is
clear: The private rms choose their abatement levels to maximize individual prots. The
public rm, however, chooses its abatement levels to maximize welfare, which includes not
only the e¤ect of its emissions on its prots but also on pollution. This constitutes our rst
result:
Lemma 1 In the equilibrium of the mixed oligopoly, the equilibrium emission intensities of
the public rm are lower than those of the private rms. That is, e0 < epr:
The above result echoes the empirical ndings in Fowlie (2010), which show that pub-
licly owned plants are more likely to invest more in pollution control technologies than
(unregulated) private rms. The comparison between the output levels of a private and
the public rm does not produce equally unambiguous results. This can be seen from the
comparison between q0 and qpr:
q0 qpr =
1
9 + 2n
(a 1) +
1
4t
t
1 + t(1 d)
(4 + n) (3 + n) : (39)
20 In the Appendix we show that the SOC hold as well.
21 In n > bn, we nd a corner solution where the public rm exits the market. In that situation, we would
revert to a private oligopoly. If n < 1, we would be considering the case where there are no private rms in
the market. As the focus of our paper is the interaction between mixed and private rms, these cases are
less worth pursuing and therefore, we discard them by imposing the upper and lower bounds on n.
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Note that only if (a 1) > (<) 14t
t
1+t(1 d)(4 + n) (3 + n) , then q0 > (<)qpr. The
intuition is the following: In contrast with the private rms (which only care about their
own prots), the welfare-maximizing public rm internalizes the e¤ects of its decisions on
both consumer (and producer) surplus as well as on environmental quality. Whereas the
former e¤ect o¤ers the public rm incentives to increase production, the latter e¤ect works
on exactly the opposite manner (since higher production leads to an increase of pollution).
Consequently the overall e¤ect is ambiguous as it depends on the relative strengths of these
e¤ects.
Note that the public rm tends to produce more than the private rm for higher values
of a and d and lower values of n. For higher values of a, there is more to gain (in terms of
consumer surplus) from increasing output; hence the public rm tends to produce more so
that to boost consumer surplus. Recall that d is the parameter that measures how e¤ective
the cleaning-up technology used by the government is (that is, how e¤ectively tax revenues
can be used to clean pollution). Hence, for higher values of d the public rm favours output,
as emissions can be more e¤ectively cleaned. Finally, the public rm tends to produce more
than the private rms for lower values of n. With fewer private rms (lower n) overall
output, and therefore emissions, tend to be lower. In that case, it is optimal for the the
public rm to promote more production.
As mentioned above, the direct e¤ect of a higher emission tax on the output level by the
private rm is negative, as it raises the marginal cost of rms. For the public rm, the e¤ect
of an increase in the emission tax on its output decision is more ambiguous. In the absence
of clean-up e¤orts by the government (d = 0), the emission tax t has only a negative e¤ect
on the output level by the public rm, due to the same reason as before. However, if d > 0,
t also has positive e¤ect on welfare through the government clean-up activities.
4 Private oligopoly
In this section we solve the case where there are only private rms in the market. So that
to keep this case comparable to the mixed oligopoly, we assume that there are n+1 private
rms in the market (that is, it is as if the public rm has been privatized). In all other
respects, the modelling of the private oligopoly is identical to the mixed oligopoly. Each
rm chooses qi and xi to maximize individual prots. The rst order conditions for prot
maximization for each rm are given by
i
@qi
= a 4qi
i0=i
qi0 tei xi = 0; (40)
i
@xi
= qi[2t(1 xi) 1] = 0; (41)
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where
i0=i
qi0 indicates the aggregation of outputs by all other private rms.
As before solving i@xi = 0 yields the following interior solutions in terms of the investment
in abatement by each private rm (xpr):
xpr = 1
1
2t
; (42)
i.e, it is symmetric across rms and, once more, it implies that a higher tax will induce
greater investments towards cleaner technologies.
Now, substituting xpr into i@qi and solving for q1, we nd the public rms (output)
reaction function
qRi =
1
4
a 1
i0=i
qi0 +
1
4t
: (43)
Given that all the private rms are symmetric, in equilibrium, we will have that qi = qpr
i: Hence, the above mentioned reaction functions reduce to
qpr =
1
4 + n
a 1 +
1
4t
: (44)
All in all qpr , xpr constitute the (Nash) equilibrium solution of the private oligopoly
case.22 Therefore, emission intensities in equilibrium are
epr =
1
4t2
: (45)
Note that the private rm invests the same under both types of oligopoly, while the
newly privatized rm invests less in the abatement technology (epr < e0).
5 Comparisons
In this section we compare the equilibrium solutions in terms of output, emission rates and
total emissions. This will allow us to make some statements regarding the desirability of
privatization for outcomes relating to output and aggregate pollution. We start with the
comparison of outputs. To save on notation, the subsequent analysis will be employing the
composite terms A a 1 and t1+t(1 d) .
22As with the mixed oligopoly case, the SOCs for maximization are fullled. Details are provided in the
Appendix.
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5.1 Output
The e¤ect of the privatization of the public rm on the private rms individual equilibrium
levels of output is given by:
qpr = qpr qpr =
1
(9 + 2n)(4 + n)
A
1
4t
[3 + n (4 + n) ] : (46)
On the other hand, the e¤ect of the privatization on the level of output of the privatized
rm is given by:
q0 = qpr q0 =
3 + n
(9 + 2n)(4 + n)
A
1
4t
[3 + n (4 + n) ] : (47)
Given that Q = q0 + nqpr and Q = (n + 1)qpr , the change in the total level of output
( Q = Q Q ) can be written as:
Q = (n+ 1)qpr (q0 + nqpr) = (48)
= n(qpr qpr) + (qpr q0) =
= n qpr q0;
or, using (46) and (47)
Q =
3
(9 + 2n)(4 + n)
A
1
4t
[3 + n (4 + n)] : (49)
Using the result of eq. (49), we can establish the following:
Proposition 1 Total output decreases (increases) with the privatization of the public rm
( Q < (>)0) if n < (>)N , where N = max 1; n and n t1 td 1 + 4A[1 + t(1 d)] 3:
Proof. Note that Q 0 if A > 14t [(3 + n) (4 + n)] : Solving the above inequality for
n, we get the critical value of n, n, below (above) which, Q is negative (positive). In
particular, n = t1 td 1 + 4A[1 + t(1 d)] 3, which by virtue of (36), can be written as
n = bn3 3 < n. Given that we have to restrict our attention to cases where n 1, then, as
long as n 1, it will be that Q > 0, n . Using (36) and t1+t(1 d) , we can establish
that n 1 corresponds to the condition A 1 t(0:25+d)t[1+t(1 d)] . When A >
1 t(0:25+d)
t[1+t(1 d)] , however,
then n > 1. Together with Condition 1, this implies that Q < 0 for n [1; n) and Q > 0
for n (n; n], thus completing the proof.
As we can see, the number of competing rms is a critical factor determining the e¤ect
of privatization on aggregate production. The literature on mixed oligopoly has so far
noted that aggregate output will decrease (see de Fraja and Delbono, 1989, 1990) or, at
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best, stay the same. The latter requires that output subsidies are provided and rms move
simultaneously (see for example, White, 1996; Poyago-Theotoky, 2001; Kato and Tomaru,
2007). If the public rm becomes Stackelberg leader after privatization - and even if output
subsidies are provided - then a privatization would be followed by a decrease in aggregate
output (Fjell and Heywood, 2004). The same result applies if the government provides R&D
subsidies, instead of output subsidies (Gil-Moltó et al, 2011). Our result is quite di¤erent,
as it shows that in less competitive industries (lower n), privatizing the public rm will
lead to a decrease in aggregate output while for more competitive markets (higher n), the
opposite will apply. Note that comparing (46) and (47) with (49), we can state that for a
high number of rms, privatizing the public rm will lead to lower output by each individual
private rm ( qpr < 0) but also to higher output by the newly privatized rm ( q0 > 0),
resulting in an overall increase in aggregate output ( Q > 0) Similarly, when the number
of private rms is small, the e¤ects of privatizing the public rm take the opposite sign
( qpr > 0 and q0 < 0), leading to a reduction in aggregate output Q < 0).
The intuition for this result can be explained by considering the objective function of
the public rm and the e¤ect of the privatization on its behavior. The public rm, in its
e¤ort to maximize welfare, has to trade-o¤ the e¤ect of its output decisions on surplus and
emissions, while when it is privatized, it does not have environmental concerns anymore
(it only maximizes prots). With a relatively high number of (private) rms, aggregate
(private) output tends to be high. Therefore, the public rm in the mixed oligopoly nds
optimal to produce less due to the e¤ect of its output on emissions. Hence, when privatized,
it raises its output, as it does no longer have any environmental concerns. Given that it
increases output, and output choices are strategic substitutes, the private rms respond by
decreasing their individual levels of output. With a relatively low number of rms, however,
aggregate output tends to be small. In this situation, in the mixed oligopoly the public rm
focuses on producing more output to boost surplus, as emissions are relatively low (due to
the lower output). As a consequence, when it becomes privatized, it will decrease its own
output, which will induce an increase in the output produced by the private rms. Overall,
aggregate output will decrease.
5.2 Emissions
First of all, note that in the move from the mixed to the private market, average emission
intensities increase. The reasons is that the privatized rm will invest less in abatement
than if it were public (epr > e0) while the private rms choice will not be a¤ected by the
privatization (epr = epr). However, the e¤ect on total emissions is less clear-cut, given
that following a privatization the individual and aggregate levels of output may increase or
decrease.
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Note that total emissions in the mixed oligopoly are given by:
= (1 dt)(e0q0 + neprqpr): (50)
After substituting the relevant equilibrium solutions and simplifying, we obtain total
emissions in mixed oligopoly:
=
1 dt
(9 + 2n)4t2
A(2n+ 3 2) +
1
4t
[(3 + n) 3 2n+ n(3 )] : (51)
In turn, total emissions in the private oligopoly are given by:
= (1 dt)(n+ 1)eprqpr ; (52)
or:
= (1 dt)
n+ 1
4 + n
1
4t2
A+
1
4t
: (53)
Therefore, the e¤ect of the privatization of the public rm on total emissions is given
by where
dt)
A(2n+3 2)+ 14t [(3+n)
3 2n+n(3 )]
(9+2n)4t2
+
n+1
4+n
1
4t2
A+ 14t
(54)
which after some tedious, but straightforward algebra, can be written as
(1 dt)
[(9 + 2n)(4 + n)] 1
4t2
F (n); (55)
where
F (n) =
(1 )2(1 + )
4t
n2 (1 ) 3A(1 + )
1 3 7 2
4t
n+
+3 A+
1
4t
1 4(1 2)
2(1 )
t
: (56)
As the reader can see, whether total emissions increase or decrease with a privatization
depends on the sign of F (n). Particularly, given (55) it will be < 0 (> 0) as long as
F (n) > 0 (< 0). Note that the rst and second derivatives of F (n) with respect to n are:
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F
0
(n) =
2n(1 )2(1 + )
4t
(1 ) 3A(1 + )
1 3 7 2
4t
; (57)
F
00
(n) =
2(1 )2(1 + )
4t
: (58)
Furthermore, it is F
00
(n) > 0; that is, F (n) is a convex function of n; n. Recall that
[1; n]. Using (36) and t1+t(1 d) in (56) we get
F (n) =
9(1 td) 6t 24A[1 + t(1 d)]
4t [1 + t(1 d)]3
; (59)
which is negative since A > 0 and [0; 1]. Thus, we want to check the sign of (56)
at n = 1 (that is, at the minimum possible value of n) to check whether F (n) is always
negative or whether it changes sign from positive to negative as n increases. Given that we
know that F (n) is a convex function of n; n, and that F (n) < 0, we know that F (n) can
change sign at most once, from positive to negative, within [1; n]. If F (1) > 0, then
we know that F (n) changes sign once (from positive to negative) within [1; n]. On the
other hand, if F (1) < 0, then F (n) < 0, n.
At n = 1, (56) becomes
F (1) =
7 t 12At [1 + t(1 d
4t [1 + t(1 d)]3
; (60)
where dt)[26(1 dt)+36t 21d] t2(3+7d3) and dt)[4(1 dt)+8t] t2.
Therefore, the sign of F (1) depends on the sign of its numerator. Recalling that t > 1=2 by
assumption, the following summarizes all the possible outcomes regarding the sign of F (1):
Lemma 2 There exist t, t, and A0 such that:
(i) If t [1=2; t) then F (1) < 0;
(ii) If t (t; t) then F (1) < 0 (> 0) if A < A0 (> A0);
(iii) If t > t then F (1) > 0:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Armed with this result and our previous analysis, we can derive the implications for the
change in total emissions after privatization as follows:
Proposition 2 After the privatization of the public rm, the change in pollution will be as
follows:
(i) Pollution will unambiguously increase if t < t or t (t; t) and A < A0;
(ii) When t (t; t) and A > A0 or when t > t, pollution may increase or decrease depending
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on the number of rms competing in the market. Particularly, there exists n, for which
F (n) = 0, such that n < n < n: Thus, in this case, pollution will decrease if n (1; n) but
it will increase if n (n; n):
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 states that for relatively low values of t, emissions will necessarily increase
with privatization. However, for relatively high values of t, privatizing the public rm will
lead to an increase (decrease) in emissions as long as the number of rms is su¢ciently
high (low). In the next section we discuss the intuition of this result, as well as the joint
implications of Propositions 1 and 2 regarding the advisability of privatization.
5.3 On the desirability of privatization
So far, we have established that the move from the mixed to a private oligopoly (i.e. follow-
ing a privatization) has implications for both total production and aggregate emissions. The
overall e¤ects depend on structural characteristics such as parameters that determine the
demand conditions, the strictness of environmental policies as well as the number of rms
competing in the market. Naturally, the most desirable outcomes would entail cases where
a reduction in emissions does not come at the cost of lower output, or equivalently when
an increase in output does not necessarily entail the negative by-product of increased total
emissions. Of course, cases where total output declines and aggregate emissions increase at
the same time are the least desirable ones.
Note that scenarios such as the ones described above are possible given that total pol-
lution is an outcome determined by two distinct factors - output and emission intensities.
Combining the results from Propositions 1 and 2, we can determine the following possible
outcomes. When parameter conditions are such that n < 1, then it must be the case that
n < 1 as well. Therefore, after privatization, we have Q > 0 and > 0. If, however,
parameter conditions satisfy n > 1, then the nal outcomes are determined as follows: For
t < t or t (t; t) and A < A0, then after privatization we have
> 0, Q < 0 for n [1; n); (61)
> 0, Q > 0 for n (n; n]: (62)
For t (t; t) and A > A0 or t > t, the outcomes that follow the privatization are
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< 0, Q < 0 for n [1; n); (63)
> 0, Q < 0 for n (n; n); (64)
> 0, Q > 0 for n (n; n]: (65)
The previous summary allows us to derive some stark implications, which are summa-
rized below:
Proposition 3 Following the privatization, an increase in output will necessarily come at
the cost of higher pollution. Similarly, a reduction in production will necessarily come at the
expense of lower output. In fact, privatization may result in simultaneously lower output
and higher pollution; an outcome where, by comparison, output is higher and pollution is
lower can emerge only under a mixed oligopoly.
The intuition behind these results is the following: As we have established earlier, the
public rm internalizes the adverse e¤ect of pollution on social welfare, thus it always
invests more resources towards abatement compared to private rms. As a result, the
privatization will unambiguously increase the average emission intensity in the economy.
Consequently, when the move towards a purely private oligopoly results in an overall increase
in production, pollution will be unambiguously higher. What is more, it may be possible
that the reduction on abatement investment under private oligopoly is so strong and the
average emission intensity so high, compared to the mixed oligopoly case, that privatization
may lead to higher total emissions even under circumstances where total output declines
(see the cases summarized by the expressions 61 and 64). On the contrary, it is only under
the mixed oligopoly, where investments in environmental improvements by the public rm
are stronger, that we have the possibility of the most desirable outcome, i.e. a situation
where total pollution is still lower despite the fact that total output is higher. Naturally,
such outcomes raise awareness to some circumstances under which privatization may lead
to the least desirable outcomes, once we consider its combined impact on both output and
the environment.
Of course, an even more formal examination regarding the desirability of privatization
would entail comparisons of the social welfare corresponding to the mixed and private
oligopolies. This is a task we undertake in the following section where we also endogenize the
tax rate on emissions. As our previous analysis and discussion suggests, apart from the cases
where privatization leads to a combination of undesirable e¤ects (i.e., when it can jointly
account for higher emissions and lower output), in many cases the impact of privatization
leads to outcomes with conicting implications for social welfare. For example, some cases
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with higher consumer surplus (due to higher output) are also associated with reductions
in social welfare due to higher pollution. Analogously, some cases where improvements
in social welfare result from lower pollution are also associated with losses to consumer
surplus (resulting from lower output) - an outcome that has a negative e¤ect on welfare.
These conicting e¤ects, together with the complexity of the equilibrium solutions (even
under our generally simple set-up) mean that it is not possible to provide any clear-cut
implications analytically. It is for this reason that we undertake this task by means of
numerical examples in the following section. In any case, we should also remember that,
in this context, changes in social welfare do not have corresponding implications regarding
Pareto optimality. The conicting e¤ects discussed above imply that some agents may be
worse o¤ (better o¤) even when social welfare improves (worsens). Still, however, this is
an appropriate measure of well-being for the society as a whole, that is why we examine its
implications in the next section.
6 Endogenously chosen tax rate
In the previous section, we have conducted the analysis of the mixed and the private
oligopoly cases assuming that the tax rate is exogenously given. As explained before, this
could reect cases where the ownership of the public rm belongs to a local authority and
emission tax is set at a national level or a situation where the ownership of the rm is held
at national level but the emission tax is set at federal level. Alternatively, the exogeneity
of the emission tax could also be related to budgetary constraints. In this section, we relax
this assumption by solving the following game. In stage 1, the government sets the tax on
emissions and commits to it. The tax is chosen to maximize social welfare which is dened
as in (16). Then, in stage 2, rms choose their abatement investments and output. We
solve the game for both the private and the mixed oligopoly. The solutions to the second
stage are those in sections 3 and 4. Given the complexity of the problem, it is not possible
to get a closed form solution for the emission tax in the mixed oligopoly. For this reason,
we will undertake the analysis by means of numerical examples. As it will become clear
from the numerical solutions, the main implications of the original set-up (see Proposition
3) survive even under the framework where the emission tax is endogenously chosen.
In Tables 1 to 4 (see Appendix), the reader can nd the equilibrium tax, output and
emissions levels for di¤erent values of the parameters a and d. For example, consider Table 1,
which provides the socially optimal tax rate and equilibrium levels of output and emissions
for a = 1:5 and d = 0. In this case, for n 15, privatization leads to lower emissions
but this comes at the expense of lower output. For n 19, total output is higher after
privatization although this comes at the expense of higher pollution. For the intermediate
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range of values of n (15 < n < 19), privatization does not only result in lower output
but also on higher emissions, which implies that privatization leads to both lower private
surplus and also more pollution. In Table 2, we have increased the value of d to 0.25, and
we can see that the same qualitative results apply. In this case, for n = 17 and n = 18, a
privatization yields lower output and higher emissions. For lower values of n, privatization
may improve the environment, but at the cost of lower output, while the opposite applies
for higher values of n. Tables 3 and 4, present two more examples with higher a, which
again show the same qualitative results. All in all, what our numerical simulations show is
that is that even with the socially optimal tax rate, the main implications of our analysis
as presented in Proposition 3 still apply.
Finally, we have also computed the social welfare values before and after privatization.
As discussed before, privatization may have conicting e¤ects on output (and therefore
surplus) and total emissions, which implies that in principle the e¤ect on social welfare is
unclear. The reader can see that our simulations indicate that privatization will tend to
negatively a¤ect social welfare. Interestingly, for a relatively low number of rms, privatizing
the public rm renders an overall negative e¤ect on social welfare, because even though
emissions are reduced, output is reduced as well. For an intermediate number of rms,
privatization results in lower output but higher emissions, and again, in an overall negative
e¤ect on social welfare. For a relatively large number of rms, privatizing the public rm
can lead to higher levels of both output and emissions, which generate opposite e¤ects on
social welfare. The simulations in our tables suggest that the interplay of these two e¤ects
results in lower levels of welfare, because the e¤ect on emissions outweighs the positive
e¤ect derived from the increase in output. A priori, however, one can envisage that the
comparison of these two e¤ects could take the opposite sign (that is, the positive e¤ect
of privatizing the public rm through output may outweigh the negative e¤ect through
emissions); which would imply that a privatization is welfare enhancing. However, at least
in our simulations, this could only happen for very large number of rms. For example, such
an outcome would require about 80 and 46 private rms in the simulations in Tables 1 and
2 respectively. Therefore, the general message that can be extracted from our simulations
is that a privatization in the context of our model will tend to damage social welfare.
7 Conclusions
The purpose of our paper was to contribute to the debate concerning the desirability of
privatization by developing a theory that o¤ers a positive analysis on the e¤ect of privatiza-
tion on both economic and environmental outcomes. In our model we consider an oligopoly
composed of one (welfare-maximizing) public rm and n (prot-maximizing) private rms.
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Firms face a proportional tax on emissions and decide on both output and the level of
abatement investment. In order to evaluate the e¤ect of privatization, we compare the
results of this model with a setting where the public rm is privatized, in the sense that its
objectives and behavior are identical to those of private rms.
Our model identied two distinct channels through which privatization impinges on the
amount of emitted pollutants. Firstly, a public rm adopts a less polluting production
process since it invests more resources towards abatement  an outcome that stems from
the idea that a welfare maximizing public rm internalizes the societal cost of pollution.
Secondly, for a given level of abatement, a public rm may produce either more or less
compared to the amount of production that would undertake had it been privately owned.
This is because of two opposing e¤ects on the public rms objective function: on the
one hand, the internalization of the societal cost of emissions favours lower production;
on the other hand, part of the public rms objective is to maximize consumer surplus 
an incentive that supports higher production. We identied the strength of competition,
captured by the number of competing rms, as a critical factor in determining which of the
two e¤ects will dominate.
The combined e¤ect of abatement investment and output decisions implies that, in
principle, reductions in total emissions may be possible, even when the total production of
the industry increases. This may happen as long as the reduction in emission intensity is
particularly strong. Nevertheless, such an outcome never actually materializes following a
privatization. Lower pollution entails the trade-o¤ of lower output (and therefore lower con-
sumer surplus). When production actually increases, following the privatization, pollution
increases as well. More strikingly, there are circumstances where privatization may lead to
the combined e¤ect of lower output and increased pollution  an outcome related to the
signicant increase in average emission intensity following the public sectors surrendering
of its direct involvement in the production of the industrys good. In terms of policy impli-
cations, our analysis indicates that, once we consider the issue of environmental quality, the
merits of privatization may be less straightforward than has often been assumed. In fact,
the combined e¤ect of production and environmental technology decisions may result in a
situation where privatization will result in a clear loss to the society. As private rms opt
for more polluting production processes, the cost of higher emission taxes leads to lower
production, but the increase in average emission intensity may be of such magnitude that
total emissions could ultimately increase. These results emerge irrespective of whether the
emission tax is either exogenously given or endogenously chosen (i.e., an emission tax set
so as to maximize social welfare).
In terms of our methodological approach, we have opted for a framework that ensures
the models tractability and transparent characterization of all the equilibrium results. This
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allowed us to retain a sharp focus on the interactions between (environmental) technology
choice and production under the setting of both mixed and private oligopolies. Moreover,
it allowed us to avoid blurring both their clarity of the results and their intuition by ab-
sconding from approaches that would have added signicant technical complication while
touching upon issues that go beyond the scope of our current analysis. Nevertheless, there
are elements that would certainly enrich the current set-up and o¤er the possibility of addi-
tional implications. For example, one could consider the scenario whereby the public rms
objectives are permeated by issues of misgovernance and corruption in the public sector,
meaning that its management may attach a reduced weight to social welfare. Another
promising direction is to consider issues that o¤er additional incentives to private rms
in undertaking investments in abatement  issues such as the presence of inuential envi-
ronmental activists or environmentally-aware consumers. Such extensions are indubitably
important, thus they represent promising avenues for future research.
8 Appendix
8.1 Second Order Conditions
8.1.1 Mixed Oligopoly
For the Public Firm:
@2SW
@q20
= 3 < 0 (A.1)
@2SW
@x20
= 2q0 [t+ (1 dt)] < 0 (A.2)
and
@2SW
@q0@x0
= 2(1 x0) [t+ (1 dt)] 1 (A.3)
Note that in equilibrium, we know that
1 x0 =
1
2 [t+ (1 dt)]
(A.4)
and therefore
@2SW
@q0@x0
=
2 [t+ (1 dt)]
2 [t+ (1 dt)]
1 = 0 (A.5)
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Thus, given that @
2SW
@q20
< 0, @
2SW
@x20
< 0 and @
2SW
@q0@x0
= 0, we know that the q0 and x0 maximize
the public rms objective function.
For the Private Firm:
@2 i
@q2i
= 4 < 0 (A.6)
@2 i
@x2i
= 2tqi < 0 (A.7)
and
@2 i
@qi@xi
= 2t(1 xi) 1 (A.8)
Note that in equilibrium, we know that
1 xi =
1
2t
(A.9)
and therefore
@2 i
@qi@xi
=
2t
2t
1 = 0 (A.10)
Thus, given that @
2
i
@q2i
< 0, @
2
i
@x2i
< 0 and @
2
i
@qi@xi
= 0, we know that the qi and xi maximize
the private rms objective function.
8.1.2 Private Oligopoly
In this case:
@2 i
@q2i
= 4 < 0 (A.11)
@2 i
@x2i
= 2tqi < 0 (A.12)
and
@2 i
@qi@xi
= 2t(1 xi) 1 (A.13)
Note that in equilibrium, we know that
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1 xi =
1
2t
(A.14)
and therefore
@2 i
@qi@xi
=
2t
2t
1 = 0 (A.15)
Given that @
2
i
@q2i
< 0, @
2
i
@x2i
< 0 and @
2
i
@qi@xi
= 0, we know that the qi and xi maximize the
private rms objective function.
8.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Firstly, consider the case where d = 1, a case where (given dt < 1), it is t [0:5; 1]. We
have 5t2 t) and 7 t 7 5t 5t2 + 20t3 = z(t) It is :5) > 0,
< 0 and t) = 0 = t = 4=5 0:894, meaning that > 0 (< 0) for t [0:5; t)
(t (t; 1]). Furthermore, z(0:5) < 0, z(1) > 0 and z (t) = 5 10t+ 60t2 > 0 t [0:5; 1]:
Therefore there is a t such that z(t) = 0, and z < 0(> 0) for t (0:5; t). In fact, t 0:927:
Thus, we can conclude that, when d = 1, F (1) is unambiguously negative (positive) when
0:5 t < t (t < t 1). For the intermediate values t (t; t), F (1) < 0 as long as
7 t 12At < 0 = 7 t > 12At A < 7 t12At = A0.
Next, let us consider the case where d = 0. now, given dt < 1, we can consider all
values for which t [1=2; ). for d = 0, we have t t2 t). It is :5) > 0,
< 0 and t) = 0 = t = (2 + 5) 8:47: Thus, > 0 (< 0) for t [0:5; t)
(t (t; 1]): Furthermore, for d = 0, we have 7 t 7 26t 36t2 + 36t3 = z(t).
Note that. z(0:5) < 0, z(1) > 0 and z (t) = 26 72t+ 108t2 > 0 t [0:5; 1]: Therefore,
there is a t such that z(t) = 0, and z < 0(> 0) for t (0:5; t). In fact, t 36:71 in this
case..Hence, for d = 0, we can conclude that F (1) is unambiguously negative (positive)
when 0:5 t < t (t < t 1). For the intermediate values t (t; t), F (1) < 0 as long as
7 t 12At < 0 = 7 t > 12At A < 7 t12At = A0.
The previous analysis has shown that qualitatively, the implications for the sign of F (1)
are identical irrespective of d = 0 and d = 1. Now denote the numerator of F (1) as
k(d) = 7 t 12At [1 + t(1 d . It is k
0
(d) = t@@d + 12At[t [1 + t(1 d)]
@
@d .
some straightforward can reveal that @@d = t
2(26 26d) t(26 21d) 26t(1 dt)
21(dt)2 21(1 dt) < 0 and t [1+ t(1 d)]@@d = 4t(1 dt)[1+ t(1 d)] + t(1 dt)[4(1
dt) + 8t] + [1+ t(1 d)]4t(1 dt) + (1 dt)8t2+7t3 > 0. Thus, k
0
(d) > 0. Therefore, given
that the expression determining the sign of F (1) is monotonic in d and that the qualitative
characteristics of F (1) are the same whether d = 0 or d = 1, we can establish that these
qualitative characteristics will be identical for any d [0; 1]:
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8.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The rst part of the proposition is straightforward because in these cases we have F (n) < 0,
n, therefore E > 0. for the second paper, we have cases for which F (1) > 0. together
with F (n) < 0 and F
00
(n) > 0, which jointly imply that there is n such that F (n) = 0 and
F (n) > 0(< 0) if n < n (n > n): Now consider the case where d = 1. One can show that in
this scenario F (n) = 0 leads to only one solution an the interval (1,n), equal to
n =
1 + 4t+ 12At+ 4t2 7t3 12At3
2(1 t)2(1 + t)
(A.16)
where = (1 4t 12At 4t2+7t3+12At3)2 4(1 t)2(1+ t)( 9+ 36At+12t3+48At3.
Comparing with the value for n we determined before (see Proposition 1), we can show
that the sign of the di¤erence n n ultimately depends on he sign of the expression 4(1 +
4At)(1 t2)2(3 t + 8At), which is unambiguously positive for t [1=2; 1] (recall dt < 1
must hold). Nevertheless, in the proof of Lemma 2, we showed that k(d), the expression
determining the sign of F (1) is monotonic and increasing in d. This implies that d [0; 1],
there is a unique n [1; n] such that n < n, thus completing the proof.
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TABLE 1: Equilibrium values for emission tax (t), output (Q) and total emissions (E) for a=1.5 
and d=0 
 Mixed oligopoly Private oligopoly After privatisation 
n<15 … ΔQ<0, ΔE<0 
n =15 
t =2.05242 t =2.08384 
ΔQ<0  
ΔE<0  
ΔSW<0 
Q =0.523075 Q =0.522081 
E =0.030087 E =0.030057 
SW=0.14086 SW=0.14030 
n =16 
t =2.06207 t =2.08871 
ΔQ<0 
ΔE>0 
ΔSW<0 
Q =0.527428 Q =0.526734 
E =0.030139 E =0.030184 
SW=0.14170 SW=0.14118 
n =17 
t =2.07081 t =2.09314 
ΔQ<0 
ΔE>0 
ΔSW<0 
Q =0.53137 Q =0.53095 
E =0.03018 E =0.03030 
SW=0.14245 SW=0.14198 
n =18 
t =2.07877 t =2.09719 
ΔQ<0 
ΔE>0 
ΔSW<0 
Q =0.53496 Q =0.53477 
E =0.03022 E =0.03039 
SW=0.143121 SW=0.14269 
n =19 
t =2.0861 t =2.1009 
ΔQ>0 
ΔE>0 
ΔSW<0 
Q =0.53824 Q =0.53826 
E =0.030254 E =0.030487 
SW=0.143733 SW=0.14335 
n>19 … ΔQ>0, ΔE>0 
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TABLE 2: Equilibrium values for emission tax (t), output (Q) and total emissions (E) for a=1.5 
and d=0.25 
 Mixed oligopoly Private oligopoly After privatisation 
n<16 … ΔQ<0, ΔE<0 
n=16 
t =1.62888 t =1.64411 
ΔQ<0 
ΔE<0 
ΔSW<0 
Q =0.554852 Q =0.554249 
E =0.030246 E =0.030191 
SW=0.15997 SW=0.15954 
n=17 
t =163416 t =1.64687 
ΔQ<0 
ΔE>0 
ΔSW<0 
Q =0.559034 Q =0.558688 
E =0.030274 E =0.0302654 
SW=0.16084 SW=0.16045 
n=18 
t =1.63895 t =1.64938 
ΔQ<0 
ΔE>0 
ΔSW<0 
Q =0.562839 Q =0.562721 
E =0.0302975 E =0.0303886 
SW=0.16162 SW=0.16127 
n=19 
t =1.64334 t =1.65169 
ΔQ>0 
ΔE>0 
ΔSW<0 
Q =0.5663 Q =0.5664 
E =0.030317 E =0.0304722 
SW=0.16233 SW=0.16201 
n>19 … ΔQ>0, ΔE>0 
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TABLE 3: Equilibrium values for emission tax (t), output (Q) and total emissions (E) for a=1.25 
and d=0.25 
 Mixed oligopoly Private oligopoly After privatisation 
n<10 … ΔQ<0, ΔE<0 
n=10 
t =1.65534 t =1.6776 
ΔQ<0 
ΔE<0 
ΔSW<0 
Q =0.31397 Q =0.31357 
E =0.00162127 E =0.0161696 
SW=0.051177 SW=0.05085 
n=11 
t =1.66592 t =1.68296 
ΔQ<0 
ΔE>0 
ΔSW<0 
Q =0.318868 Q =0.318838 
E =0.016259 E =0.0163017 
SW=0.05175 SW=0.05127 
n=12 
t =1.67516 t =1.68768 
ΔQ>0 
ΔE>0 
ΔSW<0 
Q =0.323156 Q =0.323482 
E =0.0162955 E =0.0164133 
SW=0.05225 0.05201 
n>12 … ΔQ>0, ΔE>0 
 
  
32 
TABLE 4: Equilibrium values for emission tax (t), output (Q) and total emissions (E) for a=2 and 
d=0 
 Mixed oligopoly Private oligopoly After privatisation 
n<27 … ΔQ<0, ΔE<0 
n =27 
t =2.02426 t =2.04312 
ΔQ<0 
ΔE<0 
ΔSW<0 
Q =1.01456 Q =1.01375 
E =0.06075 E =0.06071 
SW=0.52721 SW=0.52654 
n=28 
t =2.02797 t =2.04502 
ΔQ<0 
ΔE>0 
ΔSW<0 
Q =1.01771 Q =1.01704 
E =0.06078 E =0.0608 
SW=0.52837 SW=0.52772 
n=29 
t =2.03146 t =2.04682 
ΔQ<0 
ΔE>0 
ΔSW<0 
Q =1.02067 Q =1.02013 
E =0.06080 E =0.06087 
SW=0.52945 SW=0.52883 
n=30 
t =2.03475 t =2.04852 
ΔQ<0 
ΔE>0 
ΔSW<0 
Q =1.02346 Q =1.02304 
E =0.06082 E =0.06095 
SW=0.53046 SW=0.52988 
n=31 
t =2.03785 t =2.05012 
ΔQ<0 
ΔE>0 
ΔSW<0 
Q =1.0261 Q =1.02578 
E =0.0608 E =0.0610 
SW=0.53140 SW=0.53086 
n=32 
t =2.04079 t =2.05163 
ΔQ<0 
ΔE>0 
ΔSW<0 
Q =1.02859 Q =1.02837 
E =0.06086 E =0.06108 
SW=0.53230 SW=0.53178 
n=33 
t =2.04357 t =2.05306 
ΔQ<0 
ΔE>0 
ΔSW<0 
Q =1.03094 Q =1.03082 
E =0.06087 E =0.06114 
SW=0.53315 SW=0.53266 
n=34 
t =2.0462 t =2.05442 
ΔQ<0 
ΔE>0 
ΔSW<0 
Q =1.03317 Q =1.03313 
E =0.06089 E =0.06119 
SW=0.53394 SW=0.53348 
33 
n=35 
t =2.04871 t =2.05572 
ΔQ>0 
ΔE>0 
ΔSW<0 
Q =1.03529 Q =1.03533 
E =0.06090 E =0.06125 
SW=0.5347 SW=0.53426 
n>35 … ΔQ>0, ΔE>0 
 
